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Goods Beyond Price 
And Other App~ent Anachronisms 
My text tonight is a sentence from Mr. Justice Holmes's 
characteristically pithy dissent in Olmstead v. U.S. (1928) concern-
ing the admissibility of evidence obtained by bugging a bootlegger's 
telephone. 
''We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less 
evil that some criminals should escape than that the gov-
ernment should play an ignoble part." 
Ignoble? Then conceivably the government-anyone?-might 
acquit itself or himself with nobility? A quaint, romantic notion? 
To be sure, the patrician old judge was in his eighty-eighth year 
and may have gone over the hill. But a review of his writings 
shows that he had always talked that way, quite unabashedly. And 
moreover he did so with a tough skepticism that doesn't let us dis-
count him as a soft-headed romantic. 
At any rate this casual reference to nobility struck me as I was 
reflecting upon the rather meagre terms in which questions of 
public policy, and issues about action and morals generally, are 
currently discussed by people who profess to take them seriously 
and expect to be taken seriously. In short, if you want to give some-
body a reason for or against doing something, or in praise or blame 
of what has been done, the rule is to cite utility and welfare, the 
useful and the pleasant-and their contraries, the harmful, inex-
pedient, and ultimately what is painful or makes for a net balance 
of disagreeableness. A consequence of this is the effective disappear-
ance of one of the three main categories of good and evil that had 
been recognized in our culture. In Cicero's version, for example, 
they were the jucundum and utile-that is, the agreeable and the 
useful or expedient-and, what we now seem to lack, the honestum, 
what is nobly worthy of respect or reverence and its contrary, what 
is shameful, mean, or base. 
Now it happens that this thinning out of the available means 
of expression about practical issues has an interesting relation to 
the moral philosophy of utilitarianism, which also restricts its value 
vocabulary to the useful and agreeable, their contraries, and of 
course a number of synonyms for each. Utilitarianism has provided 
s 
the rationale of enlightened social refonn for nearly two centuries; 
and it has been thought to articulate the very spirit of reasonable-
ness itself. For we need only ask of any disputed practice-take 
smoking pot, for instance-What hann does it do? Although the 
fact that it's done at all distresses many straight folk who have 
never enjoyed a joint, it is hard to find persuasive evidence, inde-
pendent of pot's having a bad name, that it is harmful enough in 
other ways to outweigh the enjoyment of the millions who dig it. 
And so utilitarianism, founded on the primary value of what is 
agreeable, professes to speak for scientific rationality in action and 
promises to free us from prejudice and bring human welfare within 
our grasp. But there is growing criticism of utilitarianism in moral 
philosophy. So we may ask, if the world has pretty generally 
adopted utilitarian language and attitudes, why are so many philos-
ophers pulling in the other direction? 
One who is thus out of step is my colleague, Alan Donagan, 
whose recent book, The Theory of Morality, defends what he calls 
"common morality.'' presented as a coherent teaching which, how-
ever well or ill supported by theoretical considerations, has been 
generally recognized in the Judea-Christian West for a good two 
thousand years. It is what nearly every one of us learned at our 
mother's knee. Now one of the distinctive features of common 
morality is that it makes itself known through what a person re-
fuses, on moral grounds, to do: in "the limitations he observes in 
his pursuit of happiness."• But that means, inevitably, that what is 
agreeable, supplemented by what may be disagreeable but useful, 
is not enough to sustain common morality. For not only are 
"limitations on the pursuit of happiness" (and hence on the pursuit 
of social welfare, as the general happiness) directly incompatible 
with welfare as the measure of value, but it is obvious that there 
may always be occasions when an unqualified "no"--say to the be-
trayal of a trust-must be irrational when measured by costs and 
benefits. But then, the point of common morality-its justifying 
aim-is not to make us happy but to make us worthy of respect, 
primarily in our own eyes but also in the eyes of the moral com-
munity. 
Why, indeed, should we not trade the Shah for the hostages? 
At the cost of one moribund tyrant we might free fifty ordinary 
folk who, if not blameless, are at least innocent of vast banns. Of 
course one may argue that it is inexpedient to bargain with ter-
rorists, who are irrational anyway; but my point doesn't concern 
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the balance of benefits in this particular case, which is debatable 
-and, I should argue, inherently undecidable-on utilitarian 
grounds, but the kind of case it is. To say with common morality, 
"We refuse to entertain any such propositions," because to do so 
would be shameful, conceding that we might go back on our word 
for a price, is to invoke an order of value that is not reducible to 
the useful and agreeable. It is to say that some values are literally 
beyond price and some evils beyond redemption by any possible 
advantage. It is also to imply .that there are ends to be served for 
reasons wholly other than our happening to desire them. This 
lecture is a reminder that there are such ends and a review of some 
of their features. 
To begin with, we may note that the most frequently recog-
nized of common morality's restrictions on utilitarianism, and on 
"consequentialisms" of all sorts, are what Robert Nozick calls 
"side-constraints" on the pursuit of happiness, typically in the 
name of justice and human rights. They are familiar elements of 
a number of "mixed" theories like those of Nozick, Rawls, Singer, 
Hare, and Baier which invoke principles of fairness, universaliza-
bility, "the moral point of view," and so on, as setting constraints 
on what one does in pursuing whatever ends one seeks.2 Such 
theories all accord more or less with common morality in agreeing 
that it is impermissible to build one's earthly paradise on the backs 
of slaves, or to promote the good by exploiting anybody, for that 
matter; or to deceive people for their own or the general benefit-
all cases of violating rights and justice for a good cause. But these 
are uneasy accommodations of common morality unless there are 
goods, ends, of a different order than welfare and what is useful 
for its sake. That is, if the point of justice, probity, or fidelity is 
their utility-as in Hume's classic and never improved upon argu-
ment in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals-then 
one can't very well maintain the rationality, let alone the overriding 
priority, of sticking by the constraints of justice in the inevitable 
hard cases. For the rules of law and justice are useful only in gen-
eral, or en masse, whereas there are always situations in which 
breaking the rules will have better consequences, as the act-utili-
tarians never tire of pointing out. 
In sum, I am not objecting to side·constraints on the pursuit of 
happiness. Rather, I am claiming that one can't support such 
constraints if their sole point is to promote welfare. The integrity 
and continuing vitality of common morality implies another order 
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of ends, including but not limited to the ideals of justice and 
rectitude themselves, incommensurable with what we find agreeable 
and useful. 
We can state the issue quite sharply in terms of the possibility 
of a categorical imperative, since such a notion is more or less 
explicitly associated with the mixed doctrines that invoke side-
constraints barring the pursuit of happiness in wrongful ways. It 
is too seldom recognized that any unqualified moral prescription, 
formulating a strict obligation to do or not to do something, de-
pends on there being some morally necessary end. For, since every 
intentional action, properly so called, must have an end, if all ends 
were morally contingent, all imperatives would be hypothetical, de-
pending on what ends one happened to accept. Any such im-
perative is irrelevant to anyone who doesn't accept the end which is 
its condition. It does no good to protest that certain basic rules 
are entailed by "the moral point of view," as with Baier, or by the 
logic of the language of morals, as with Hare. For suppose one 
declines to play Hare's "moral language game" or adopts some 
other point of view(3 Tastes and life-plans differ, so that, as a 
student remarked the other day, "Last year I was into morality, but 
it was a drag; so this year I'm into ecology and the no nukes move-
ment." 
I will have more to say about the sort of ends that could be 
objectively required of any rational agent. For the present it will 
suffice to cite the conclusion of Kant's argument in his Doctrine of 
Virtue, which I have been paraphrasing: without such ends "the 
doctrine of morals"-that is, of morals as what I have followed 
Donagan in calling common morality, with its unqualified refusals 
-"would be destroyed."4 Without it we have only the rules of 
technology and prudence to guide us. 
Before I go on to explore the possibility of values that may be 
inherently worthy of our service and respect it may be in order to 
review some reasons why the very idea of such values has come to 
be regarded as a Quixotic anachronism. The first and obvious 
reason is that, as we have seen, such notions entail "absolutes," at 
least in the form of prohibitions to be honored at any cost--even, 
it may be, at the cost of one's life, for to do some things, however 
useful or pleasing the goal, would render one unfit to live. When 
it is put that way, we are reminded of "taboo moralities," of 
fanaticism and' superstition, impervious to the light of rational 
criticism. Put positively, the faith that there are ideals for which it 
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is not absurd to offer up one's life seems merely Quixotic. In any 
case, absolutes are out of fashion. They are "unscientific." 
A second reason for thinking only in terms of utility and wel-
fare is less obvious but probably more fundamental. It too is 
attributable to habits of scientific thinking, especially in the be-
havioral sciences, when they are incautiously generalized beyond 
their proper sphere. 
We are undoubtedly creatures whose nature is to have "wants," 
and accordingly our behavior can be explained for the most part 
as consisting of attempts to serve our wants, just as we explain the 
behavior of our relatives, the animals who have sensory and motor 
equipment similar to our own. A rat feels hunger, which is painful, 
and he learns what will assuage it, the consumption of which is 
pleasing. The behavior that brings his reward is thereby rein-
forced, becoming more frequent. At the human level the universal 
need to fill the gut, encountering differently available foodstuffs 
and different skills that make the stuff edible, manifests itself in so 
many dietary patterns that Hilaire Belloc could pretend to com-
plain: 
Alas, what varying tastes in food 
Divide the human brotherhood! 
Birds in their little nests agree 
With Chinamen, but not with me. 
More generally, objects like bird's nest soup, desired because they 
are found to be agreeable, become objects not only of desire but 
"objects" in an importantly different sense; that is, "objectives" or 
ends-in-view by which we organize our deliberate choices. So, 
allowing for an indefinite differentiation and sophistication of basic 
drives, we can explain the most complicated human behavior 
according to the hypothesis that it all serves the wants of our 
"animal" nature, albeit at some remove. Applied to behavior in 
the aggregate, this hypothesis works very well, as we see in the 
success of venturesome economists like Gary Becker who account 
for changing divorce and crime rates by variations in their costs 
and rewards. Thus if everything we do serves some want or other, 
we have no need of any value concepts except the useful and the 
immediately agreeable in order to explain the phenomena of be· 
havior. 
Nevertheless it is a mistake to identify the possible ends of 
human action with the objects of desires or "wants," although it is 
quite true that most objects of our endeavors are also objects of 
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desire. We make this mistake by confusing the rational structure 
of scientific description and explanation, employed as we view the 
world from the theoretic perspective of an observer, with the anal· 
ogously rational structure of action, viewed from the perspective 
of an agent operating in the world. Fortunately, this crucial dis-
tinction can be exhibited in the most familiar terms without 
appealing to anything esoteric. All we need do is reflect on what it 
is to act intentionally and deliberately, as we all do. 
Let us begin, then, with an elementary choice situation, subject 
to the simplest of rational constraints. Given that doing X is a 
necessary condition of achieving Y, if I intend to achieve Y, I must 
do X. This is logically equivalent to 'If I choose not to do X, I 
thereby give up Y as an end.' You can't make an omelette without 
breaking eggs, but you don't have to make an omelette. As lm· 
manuel Kant put it, "he who wills the end wills the means"-
necessarily, because the alternative is incoherent. But what does 
'will' mean here? If 'wills' is taken as 'wants,' the alleged principle 
is not necessarily true. Indeed, it is not true at all, not even as a 
rough generalization. For example, I do want a trim figure, but I 
emphatically do not want to give up my eating habits, which are 
the source not only of my expanding waistline but of many enjoy-
ments, both gustatory and social. On the other hand, to take slim-
. ming as the end of my endeavor is necessarily to forgo those habits 
and their pleasures in view of my understanding of the facts of food 
chemistry and the laws of nature. To fail to take those steps is to 
repudiate slimness as my end but not, alas, to destroy my wish for 
it-just as taking those steps does not free me from the pangs of 
frustrated appetite. Deliberate action, then, is subject to rational 
constraints which still preserve freedom of choice; and the formula, 
"If you intend to slim down, you must do whatever you know to be 
necessary," simply makes such constraints explicit. Desires and 
inclinations, on the other hand, seem to have a life of their own 
that is but little subject to our control, although we may take a pill 
to reduce anxiety and let sleep "knit up the ravelled sleeve of care." 
It is easy to overlook· this homely distinction between ends of 
action and objects of desire because, finding wants to be somehow 
"given" by nature and circumstances, we are naturally concerned 
with ways and means to appease them, for that is how deliberation 
proceeds-from "given" ends to available means. But what if we 
focus on ends-on the other end of the stick? Of course we all 
want countless things, many of which. never function as ends for us 
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at all. How, then, do the objects of wishes or of other wants become 
ends when they do? Well, we "elect" them-adopt them, make 
them our own. Nothing, and nobody, can make me try to slim 
down, for example; and nothing is more common than such inten-
tions taken up and acted upon for a while, only to be abandoned as 
we get bored or the going gets rough and we tire. To be sure, my 
friends may "reason with me" when I falter. In doing so, they 
remind me of other things I want whose realization depends on 
slimming. "Think of your health and not just your vanity," they 
urge, ''even your life, which your high cholesterol level clearly 
endangers." Such appeals merely focus on other things which my 
friends hope I may acknowledge among my ends because I want 
them. Now all this may "move" me emotionally, both in gratitude 
for their concern and through reminders of what I profoundly 
wish. But I still may not "move myself" to any relevant action. 
That is to say, again, that although wants are considerations in 
view of which we select their objects as ends, when we do, they are 
never decisive by themselves. Although we usually do pursue things 
that we want, responding to "nature's call," the essential difference 
between health as something wanted and health as a practical end 
is that while we have no direct control over the desire for it, we 
can always take it or leave it as an end-whatever our desires, and 
whatever we may discover to be useful for achieving ~heir agreeable 
objects. Strictly speaking, we cannot be forced to make anything 
an object of intentional action-of our "wills" as Kant would say 
-not even "on pain of death." For we can, even in such straits, 
choose death, all things considered. It is so chosen frequently 
enough to make that clear, and not only by madmen. "My only 
regret," said Nathan Hale, "is that I have but one life to lay down 
for my country." This is not to say that you or l-or many other 
people-would stick to such a resolve when the chips were down. 
A behavioral scientist would surely be rash to predict anything of 
the kind, for his business is with what most people do most of the 
time. But that l--or you-could, in a perfectly familiar sense of 
'could,' is not for a reflective person to deny. 
Well, then, we can agree that for purposes of explaining or 
predicting behavior it is sufficient to treat it as being on the whole a 
more or less self-conscious pursuit of objects and activities wanted 
because experience has taught us that they are pleasing or useful. 
Such conceptual parsimony is itself a useful scientific policy, and 
it is not surprising that, generalizing as we are prone to do, we 
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should be inclined to assume that we have no alternative but to 
serve whatever wants our circumstances provide. However, the 
principal point of this review has been to show that when we reftect 
on our choices in concrete situations, we recognize that we are free 
to reject the object of any particular want, and even to resign from 
the want-serving business as a primary concern, provided that the 
term 'wants' is reserved for motives whose objects are somehow 
given to us rather than being invented and set up as targets or 
ideals to aim aL It is as if, in adopting the standpoint of choice, we 
placed ourselves above the pushes and pulls of inclination where 
we can give the nod to this one, that one, or none of them as we 
choose. The goals on which we set our sights are for us to deter-
mine, subject to the limiting fact that no continuing effort toward 
any objective is possible unless we do what is necessary to keep the 
human mechanism and its instrumentation running.G 
But whether there is much to say for any human vocation other 
than the want-serving game remains to be seen. Why not setde for 
the useful and the agreeable? We might do worse, living counter-
productively and miserably. It is for his very personal testimony 
about this question that I will call Justice Holmes as a witness as 
soon as I have read into the record some broad implications of the 
utilitarian want-serving program. They have been formulated very 
nicely by Stuart Hampshire, the Lindley Lecturer for 1965, in an-
other lecture commemorating Sir Leslie Stephen in which he ex-
presses some reasonable doubts about that Victorian's utilitarian 
legacy. 
It is, he points out, a curiously ambivalent doctrine. On the 
one hand it presumes to exalt mankind and a few of the higher 
animals "as at the very center of the universe, with their states of 
feeling as the source of all value in the world," yet at the same time 
it demeans mankind in another respect. For "if nothing else counts 
but states of mind"-what Jeremy Bentham called "grateful (or 
ungrateful) feelings"-then "the whole machinery of the natural 
order ..• just is machinery, useful or harmful as it promotes or 
prevents desired states of feeling."& If so, as science fiction has not 
been slow to suggest, nature's machinery may be bypassed by 
human art so as to produce agreeable feelings much more direcdy, 
and in larger amounts, than by the cumbersome mechanisms of 
nature and culture-say by pills or electric stimuli that work direct-
ly on the nerve centers. To be sure, the old-fashioned pleasures of 
a walk in the country can't be had without walking in the country: 
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but what matter, if equal or stronger kicks may be enjoyed without 
all that fuss and bother at one's handy bliss generator? So much 
for the intricate rituals of civilization! And then, Hampshire notes, 
the utilitarian goes a step further and "carries the deritualization of 
transactions between men to a point at which men not only can, 
but ought to, use and exploit each other as they use and exploit any 
other natural objects," so far as this increases the world's balance of 
agreeable feelings. 
H you find this picture of our business on earth a disagreeable 
one, that is not a relevant objection, for it only adds to the list of 
differing tastes without affecting the thesis itself. To be sure I have 
argued that we are not bound to the want-serving, utility·maximiz· 
ing rat race, for we can always resign from it. But that may require 
resigning from life too unless there are values of a different sort 
than the useful and agreeable, as I have said often enough to have 
risked becoming disagreeable myself. 
Now, for first-hand testimony in favor of an alternative slant 
on man's vocation, made credible by the witness's experience more 
than by the arguments of the philosophers who also speak for it, I 
will read and comment on some items from Holmes's Speeches, full 
as they are of what may at first strike you as nonsense or worse.' 
Given to fellow members of some semi-private community of shared 
memories and commitment-a New England Memorial Day or 
Harvard commencement, a Bar Association dinner, a class reunion 
-these "chance utterances of faith and doubt," as he calls them, 
were not intended for publication. That came later, as friends 
collected them for circulation among themselves and eventually for 
a wider audience. 
The two themes of faith and doubt are each indispensable, for 
the doubt profoundly affects the faith. Throughout there is a 
gentle disdain for the want-serving game as the pursuit of an 
illusion, and a faith that it is more to one's credit, and even more 
satisfying despite the inevitable pain, to make something of oneself: 
to bring oneself as close to some self-imposed standard of achieve-
ment as one can. This-called the pursuit of virtue in the language 
of philosophy-is obviously held to be good for its own sake; for 
well-founded doubt undermines any promise of a pay-off at the end 
of the road. We can seldom tailor events to fit our wants, but we 
can always face our fortune, good or bad, with dignity and courage, 
and enjoy the satisfaction of work well done. 
II 
Consider this, to the Harvard Class of 1895, just before their 
graduation: 
"The society for which many philanthropists, reform-
ers, and men of fashion unite in longing is one in which 
they may be comfortable and may shine without much 
trouble or any danger •.. " 
They unite too in 
"the doctrine that evil means pain, and the revolt against 
pain in all its forms has grown ever more marked. From 
societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals up to 
socialism we express in numberless ways the notion that 
suffering is a wrong that can be and ought to be pre-
vented, and a whole literature ••• has sprung into being 
which points out in story and vene how hard it is to be 
wounded in the battle of life, how terrible, how unjust 
it is that anyone should fail." 
Since 1895 the longing for a society in which one may be 
comfortable and "shine without much trouble or any danger" is no 
longer confined to "philanthropists, reformers, and men of fash-
ion," for we have experienced the "revolution of rising expecta· 
tions;" and the injustice of anyone's failing seems to have become 
an axiom of both enlightened opinion and public policy. However, 
that axiom owes much to the belief that the earth's bounty is 
sufficient for everyone, were it not diverted and misappropriated by 
the wicked. Now, when we are beginning to suspect that the gravy 
train has been indefinitely side-tracked, we may be more receptive 
to a different view. At any rate, he continues, 
"For my part I believe that the struggle for life is the order 
of the world, at which it is vain to repine. I can imagine 
the burden changed in the way it is to be borne, but I 
cannot imagine that it will ever be lifted from men's 
backs .••. Now, at least, and perhaps as long as man dwells 
upon the globe, his destiny is battle, and he has to take the 
chances of war .... It is not well for soldiers to think much 
about wounds. Sooner or later we shall fall; but mean-
time it is for us to fix our eyes. on the point to be stormed, 
and to get there if we can .•.. 
The ideals of the past for men have been drawn from 
war ... (and] for all our prophecies, I doubt if we are 
ready to give up our inheritance .... What has [the ideal 
of the gentleman] been built on but the soldier's choice of 
honor rather than life? .•• To be ready to give one's life 
rather than to suffer disgrace, that is what the word has 
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meant; and if we try to claim it at less cost than a splendid 
carelessness for life, we are trying to steal the good will 
without the responsibilities of the place. . . . Who of us 
could endure a world, although cut up into five-acre lots 
and having no man upon it who was not well fed and well 
housed, without the divine folly of honor, without the 
senseless passion for knowledge outreaching the .•. bounds 
of the possible, without ideals the essence of which is that 
they never can be achieved? I do not know what is true. 
I do not know the meaning of the universe. But in the 
midst of doubt, in the collapse of creeds, there is one thing 
I do not doubt, ... and that is that the faith is true and 
adorable which leads a soldier to throw away his life in 
obedience to a blindly accepted duty, in a cause which he 
little understands, in a plan of campaign of which he has 
no notion, under tactics of which he does not see the use." 
'\\1ere he to have said that seventy-five years later, to the 
Harvard graduates of I 970, he might have been driven off the plat-
form, not only for sacrilege against security and comfort but for 
seeming to urge upon them the role of cannon fodder-ignorant, 
unquestioning brutes to be manipulated by the imperialists who 
are said to make wars. But that would have been hasty of them, 
failing to notice that his closing image, of what Matthew ·Arnold 
called, with a different intent, "ignorant armies clash[ing] by 
night," is a metaphor for the whole human condition. And therein 
lies, he thinks, the source of whatever dignity is possible for us. 
The theme that you can have no finer hour than when you go all 
out in a pursuit that you may not survive, under conditions you 
neither control nor fully understand, is a constantly recurring one; 
and it applies to the scholar, artist, lawyer, and amateur athlete as 
much as to the soldier. " ... A man may live greatly in the law as 
well as elsewhere," he used to say. 
We should note that his "faith" is not at all what many, 
perhaps most people, have come to understand by that term-that 
is, an utterly groundless assurance that everything will be made 
right in the end; tltat the pain and bruises of the struggle will have 
their due co.mpensation; that the management of the universe is 
just, and it is ·"unjust that anyone should fail." That sort of faith 
is moonshine, and not to the point· anyway; for if this absurdity 
could be true and its truth be made known to us, we would be 
robbed of what gives human agency its dignity. If we knew that all 
our accounts' would be balanced on some Judgment Day, courage 
and honor would be impossible because every undertaking of effort 
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or pain would be a guaranteed gilt-edged bond, as safe as safe could 
be. Courage and nobility would be reduced to prudent invest-
ments; and even prudence, which makes no sense without risk, 
would itself be nonsense. H every choice had its assured pay-off, 
what would be the point of being smart, let alone brave? Indeed 
what could be the point of any form of human agency? 
The "soldier's faith," which is Holmes's paradigm, looks to 
moral experience for its support, although some never have the 
requisite experience and some who do never learn its lesson. It is 
evident to a reader of the Speeches that for him the decisive moral 
experience was the Civil War, which accounts for his pervasive 
military imagery. There isn't time for his most graflic references to 
the war, but this may suffice to show the basis of his faith: 
" ... If you have advanced in line and have seen ahead of 
you the place where the rifle bullets are striking; ••• if you 
have had a blind fierce gallop against the enemy, with lour 
blood up and a pace that left no time for fear-i , in 
short, • . . you have known the vicissitudes of terror and 
triumfh in war, you know that there is such a thing as the 
faith spoke of. You know your own weakness and are 
modest; but you know that man has in him that unspeak-
able somewhat that makes him capable of miracle, able to 
lift himself by the might of his own soul, unaided, able to 
face annihilation for a blind belief." 
However, this is no infatuation with the so-called glories of 
war; it is rather reverence for the human capacity for greatness 
under strain: 
''War, when you are at it, is horrible and dull. It is only 
when time has passed that you see that its message was 
divine. I hope 1t may be long before we are called again 
to sit at that master's feet. But some teacher of the kind 
we all need. In this smug, over·safe corner of the world we 
need it, that we may realize that our comfortable routine 
is no eternal necessity of things but merely a little space of 
calm ..• and in order that we may be ready for danger •••• 
We need it everywhere and all the time. For high and 
dangerous action teaches us to believe as right beyond 
dispute things for which our doubting minds are slow to 
fina words of proof •••. The proof comes later, and even 
may never come." 
You may be wondering that there has been no particular 
mention of one of the customary touchstones of morality, altruistic 
service to mankind, whether by feeding the hungry, binding up the 
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wounded, or ra1smg the down-trodden. What we have instead 
seems to be a great deal about the strenuous life of self-realization. 
He has allowed for this in another way, of course, since the "splen-
did carelessness for life" he admires is not careless of other people's 
lives but of one's own-scarcely the mark of your vulgar egoist. 
And he would surely agree that one might live-or die-as hero-
ically ministering to a leper colony as on a battlefield. In fact 
Holmes is little impressed by the usual opposition between self and 
other, or by the more philosophical opposition between duty and 
self-interest. The reason for this will be instructive; the fact is 
clear in these remarks to the Boston Bar Association: 
"The joy of life is to put out one's powers in some 
natural and useful or hannless way. There is no other. 
And the real misery is not to do this. . . The rule of joy 
and the law of duty seem to me all one. I confess that 
altruistic and cynically selfish talk seem to me about 
equally unreal .•.• If you want to hit a bird on the wing, 
you must have all your will in a focus, you must not be 
thinking about yourself, and, equally, you must not be 
thinking about your neighbor; you must be living in your 
eye on that bird. Every achievement is a bird on the wing. 
The joy, the duty, and, I venture to add, the end of 
life. I speak only of this world, of course. . • • But from 
the point of view of the world, the end of life is life. Life 
is action, the use of one's powers. As to use them to their 
height is our joy and duty, so it is the one end that justifies 
itsel£."8 
It is time now to draw together the threads of this lecture's 
argument and develop some of their implications. If we humans 
have, as I have argued, the capacity to act for ends of our own 
devising, not limited to the useful and agreeable objects of given 
"wants," then we are, all of us, something special.D And should 
there be, somewhere in the universe, other rational agents, perhaps 
with quite different physical support systems and correspondingly 
different needs and wants, they would be special too in a kindred 
way. This freedom each of us has that makes him, in Holmes's 
words, "capable of miracle, able to lift himself by the might of his 
own soul" is at least latent in everyone, endowing each of us with a 
dignity not commensurate with the values we ascribe to the objects 
of our wants, all of which have a price relative to other objects of 
other wants. Accordingly, this freedom and its dignity command 
a respect that does not depend on what anyone actually makes of 
his powers and thereby of himself.JO 
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It is this dignity that is the ground of universal human rights 
and equality before the law, the recognition of which sets limits on 
the conduct of all our pursuits, as common morality and the 
"mixed" doctrines about side-constraints also recognize. But to my 
way of thinking, the latter doctrines have nothing explicit to say 
about the point-if they have a point-of fairness, rights, and 
actions prescribed by "the moral point of view;" and although they 
cite the so-called "intuitions" imbedded in common morality, they 
are silent as to the authority of such intuitions. However by this 
time we can see that to overstep the limits of justice and rights is 
shameful, base, just because it subordinates the dignity of humanity 
to the baser metal of objects whose value varies with the wants we 
happen to have. It is not that punishment or other dire con-
sequences may be visited upon an offender, but that disrespect for 
human dignity in pursuing some want is, simply, beneath the 
dignity of any agent capable of the "miracle" of living by his own 
acknowledged standard, unmoved by fear and pain and the siren 
song of pleasures. 
It is notable in this connection that most terms, like 'shameful' 
and 'noble,' that typically designate values beyond calculation seem 
to reflect back upon the qualities of agents as their primary refer-
ents, and to apply to external behavior and situations through a 
metaphor. That is, a state of affairs is called shameful and an act 
noble because the former is a situation anyone would be ashamed 
to be responsible for, the other an act that only a person of 
resplendent virtue could have done. Even a properly just act is 
identifiable as being of the kind a just person would do, although 
in this case we allow that debts can be justly paid even by the 
unjust and for reasons remote from justice, for it may be expedient 
to pay. That such concepts reflect back upon the character of the 
agent indicates, I suggest, that the primary claim of morality is 
addressed not only to agents but as concerning agents, demanding 
that they measure up in spirit as well as in the letter.11 That is, the 
shame of meanness arises less from the harm done-which may be 
negligible or devastating as chance decrees-than from failure to 
live up to one's minimal self-set mark, just as the reward of virtue 
lies in the satisfaction of coming closer to one's ideal than might 
reasonably have been expected. It is because moral duties are in 
this way primarily "to" ourselves and our self-respect even when, as 
in the case of justice at;td the "social" virtues, they prescribe trans-
actions concerning others, that I think Holmes found the ordinary 
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opposition between the interests of self and others "unreal" to one 
who, using his powers at their height, realizes "the joy, the duty, 
and the end of life" in one activity. 
So now, having at first spoken for the apparent anachronism 
of making a place in our practical categories for values like dignity, 
nobility, and baseness along with the utilities and pleasures of 
want-serving, I have just been speaking for a further "outdated" 
notion, that of duties to oneself, which utility-maximizers regard as 
absurd. And I have compounded my heterodoxy by suggesting that 
these are conditions of all proper duties; for duties must be self-
imposed in recognition of the freedom and dignity of our rational 
agency; and as self-legislated they can only be self-monitored and 
self.enforced. Each person ought to care for his own soul, though 
he do so by caring for the rights and welfare of others.tSl 
Finally there is a third apparent anachronism, equally unin-
telligible to those who find the former two to be so because con-
ceptually interrelated with them. It is the idea of a rationally 
necessary end, and it calls for brief attention here although a 
proper case for it would take at least another lecture. Recall that 
I presented an argument to the effect that the unqualified refusals 
of common morality to sanction certain kinds of behavior, come 
what may, like the "splendid carelessness for life" of Holmes's 
heroes, imply a categorical imperative. And I argued further that 
a categorical imperative in turn implies an end that is not ration-
ally contingent, acceptable or rejectable as one may wish, notwith-
standing the fact that no end forces itself upon one's choice, for 
moral necessity is that of an "ought," not a "must." I now add 
that such an end must be an end in the full sense, as an objective 
to be pursued in action, because every act must have an end for the 
sake of which whatever is done is done.ts 
While I have clearly endorsed the doctrine that a rational 
agent, having a dignity as such, is to be regarded as an objective 
"end in itself," as Kant put it, this is not all that is called for. For 
one thing, a person can not be an objective of action; and as Kant 
himself went on to explain, a person can be an end only in a 
negative, restrictive sense, as a being whose dignity one may not act 
against by treating it as a mere instrument.14 The present issue is 
a different one. 
As sometimes happens in the search for an elusive idea, I think 
we shall find that the morally necessary end in question has been 
present all along and needs only to be made explicit by reflection. 
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Since there is little profit and no dignity in the want-serving game, 
it was said that it is more to one's credit, and even more satisfying 
in its way, to "make something of oneself;" that everyone ought to 
care for his own soul by attending to the development and per-
fection of his character and powers.tli But this, which philosophers 
have called the pursuit of virtue, activity informed by which-or 
by a good will, it makes no difference which we say-is its own end 
and the supreme good, is then the comprehensive ethical duty that 
grounds all the particular ones and whose object is the end which 
free rational agency prescribes to itself.tG 
Let me close by coming back to earth and to Holmes's often 
quoted remarks at the fiftieth reunion of his Harvard class of '61: 
"Man is born a predestined idealist, for he is born to 
act. To act is to affirm the worth of an end, and to persist 
in affirming the worth of an end is to make an ideal. The 
stern experience of our youth . • . left us feeling through 
life that pleasures do not make hafpiness and that the 
root of joy as of duty is to put out al one's powers toward 
some great end." 
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